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Abstract
Despite its essential role in human coexistence, the developmental origins and progression of sympathy in infancy are not
yet fully understood. We show that preverbal 10-month-olds manifest sympathetic responses, evinced in their preference
for attacked others according to their evaluations of the respective roles of victim, aggressor, and neutral party. In
Experiment 1, infants viewing an aggressive social interaction between a victim and an aggressor exhibited preference for
the victim. In Experiment 2, when comparing the victim and the aggressor to a neutral object, infants preferred the victim
and avoided the aggressor. These findings indicate that 10-month-olds not only evaluate the roles of victims and aggressors
in interactions but also show rudimentary sympathy toward others in distress based on that evaluation. This simple
preference may function as a foundation for full-fledged sympathetic behavior later on.
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Introduction
Sympathy, or the feeling of concern for others, plays a crucial
role in human social relationships and constitutes one of the most
important components of human coexistence. For centuries,
philosophers have offered penetrating insights into its nature [1],
and even now, it is the subject of expansive debates across multiple
disciplines. However, despite its important role, its developmental
origins and progression in infancy are not yet fully understood.
Researchers have suggested that even newborns respond to
others in distress by resonating with others’ emotional states
through mechanisms such as emotional contagion (e.g., crying
when others cry [2,3]) but that true other-orientation does not
develop until the second year of life, when infants can differentiate
between self and others (e.g., mirror self-recognition [4,5]).
Developmental studies tend to agree that sympathetic concern
for others emerges around the age of 18 months [6,7], and
sympathetic response for others (e.g., comforting) develops over
the second year of life [8,9]. This behavior evolves rapidly, with 3-
year-olds intervening to protect victims from an aggressor [10].
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated
sympathetic behavior during the developmental period between
the emergence of the sympathetic response for others in newborns
and clear concern for others in toddlers. In an attempt to fill this
gap, the present study explored whether preverbal infants show
rudimentary sympathy for others.
It has been demonstrated that preverbal infants have well-
developed socio-cognitive capacities before their second year of life
[11–13]: for example, infants in their first year can discriminate
between positive and negative interactions (hitting) in geometric
figures [11]. In addition, infants in the second half of their first
year showed a preference for or avoidance of characters who
previously engaged in helping or hindering behavior, respectively
[12]. In this study, when infants evaluated the hindering behavior,
they required the notion that blocking (hitting) is bad behavior.
Even in a more controlled experiment [14], infants regarded such
hitting interactions as negative. Combined with the findings that
infants begin to understand causal agency in the second half of the
first year [15–17], these studies raise the possibility that infants
have some (implicit or explicit) knowledge that hitting leads to the
distress of the attacked others. Considering these studies, preverbal
infants may possess the cognitive abilities necessary for showing a
sympathetic response toward attacked others. In addition, de Wall
has reported that implicit, automatic responses (e.g., approach)
toward distressed others are often observed in primates; this is
referred to as ‘‘preconcern’’ [18,19]. According to his theory,
organisms are naturally endowed with such responsiveness, which
functions as a simple behavioral rule: ‘‘If you feel another’s pain,
get over there and make contact.’’ Taken together, if infants
watched an aggressive interaction, such as one agent hitting
another, then they would show an automatic response (e.g., gaze
and approach) toward the victim.
We used a simple geometric animation to initiate this
rudimentary and automatic sympathetic response in infants; the
use of such animated figures has been well established in many
infant studies. Infants in their first year of life attribute goals and
intentionality to geometric figures [20].Moreover, they can
attribute disposition [21], valence [12], and social dominance
[22,23] to figures based on previous interactions among them. To
investigate infant automatic response toward victims in an
animated sequence, we used preferential-looking methods that
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examined visual preference [24] and forced-choice methods
whereby infants could express preferences through reaching
behavior [12–14]. In the present experiments, we hypothesize
that if preverbal infants feel rudimentary sympathy for attacked
others, they should manifest an automatic approach response
toward the victim in third-party affiliation situations. Specifically,
we hypothesize that after observing aggressor-victim interactions,
infants will prefer victims to aggressors.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we tested whether preverbal 10-month-olds
prefer victims to aggressors after observing aggressor-victim
interactions (Aggressive Interaction [AI] condition). To confirm
that the aggressive interaction between the two figures affected
infants’ preferences, a control condition (No Interaction [NI]
condition) was established in which the two figures appeared to
move independently and without any contact.
Methods
Participants. Forty 10-month-olds (20 male, 20 female;
mean age = 301 days, range = 288–314 days) were randomly
assigned to either the AI (n=20) or NI conditions (n=20). Eight
additional infants were tested but not included in the final sample
because of fussiness (n = 2) or a failure to meet the inclusion
criterion (n= 6), which was reaching for or grasping a single object
within 45 s of it being presented.
Stimuli and procedure. Infants were seated on their
parents’ laps in a darkened room; they faced a 32-inch TV
monitor that presented a video with animations of geometric
objects. Parents were instructed not to talk, interact, or interfere
with their infants during the experiment. The viewing distance
between the monitor and the infant was approximately 60 cm.
The animated stimuli were created using Poser 6.0 (e frontier
Inc.). The animated stimuli were presented on a monitor in the
observation room via a remote laptop computer controlled by an
experimenter. Adobe Flash CS3 Professional (Adobe Systems Inc.)
controlled the animated stimuli. Videos of infant eye movements
and the corresponding stimuli were viewed simultaneously as split
and inverted images using a Mutech inversion memory unit
(MVF-120) and a Houei Multi viewer (MV-40F). These videos
were recorded for offline coding.
In the familiarization phase, infants watched an animated
sequence six times. The familiarization sequence showed a blue
ball and a yellow cube moving across a black background within a
green enclosure. During AI familiarization trials, the blue ball
chased the yellow cube and hit it seven times during each trial,
violently attacking and crushing the yellow cube at the end of each
sequence (Fig. 1a and Video S1). In the NI condition, we changed
the position of the victim figure such that the two figures appeared
to move independently and without any contact (Fig. 1b and
Video S2). Familiarization events in each condition presented two
alternating examples (see another version of the aggressive
interaction in Video S3). Movement speed, momentum, and
extent of deformation were identical for the geometric figures in
each condition. Each animated sequence lasted 20 s. Attractive
animated clips with sound were played between trials to keep
infant attention focused on the monitor. The roles of aggressor and
victim for the two geometric figures were counterbalanced across
participants.
During the test phase, infants were presented with a video
showing the two, now static, geometric figures side by side against
a black background for 30 s, to measure their preferences for each
figure. In a subsequent choice task, an experimenter (blinded to
the roles of the two geometric figures) presented two real objects
on the desk in front of an infant and encouraged him or her to
choose between a blue ball 6.5 cm in diameter and a yellow cube
with 6.5 cm sides, corresponding to the animated geometric
figures. The distance between the two objects was 30 cm. The
presentation position of the two objects (left or right) was
counterbalanced across participants.
Data analysis. The time that infants spent looking at each of
the animated stimuli was recorded during the familiarization trials,
as well as the time that each infant spent looking at whichever
static geometric figure or figures during the 30-s preferential-
looking test trial. Looking times for each infant were measured
offline at a rate of 30 frames per second by two trained research
assistants who were blind to experimental conditions. One
assistant coded all participants, while the other independently
coded a random 20% sample of participants in each condition.
The two coders reached 91% agreement on the preferential-
looking test trial for each of the looking-time frames.
After confirming that an infant had looked at both objects prior
to responding in the choice test, preference for the objects was
measured by recording which of the two objects the infant reached
for or grasped first. To be included in the analyses, the infant had
to reach for or grasp a single object (not two objects) within 45 s of
the object presentation.
Ethics statement. The research was approved by the ethics
review board at the Department of Psychology, Kyoto University.
All infants participated with written informed consent from their
parents.
Results and Discussion
The two coders reached 96% agreement on looking time in the
familiarization trials. Regarding the mean looking times, there was
no significant difference between the AI and NI conditions (AI
mean=17.5 s, NI mean= 16.9 s, t(38) = 1.026, p=0.312,
d=0.33).
In the test phase, the looking-time measurements were analyzed
using a mixed factorial analysis of variance with role (victim versus
aggressor) as the within-participants factor and nature of
interaction (AI versus NI) as the between-participants factor. We
observed no significant main effects for role, F(1, 38) = 0.733,
p= .397, gp
2 = .019, or nature of interaction, F(1, 38) ,0.01,
p= .991, gp
2,.001, nor was there a significant interaction
between these two factors, F(1, 38) = 0.01, p= .920, gp
2,.001.
This null result indicates that infants did not preferentially look at
either the victim or the aggressor in either interaction condition
(AI: meanvictim = 8.2 s, meanaggressor = 8.3 s; NI: meanvictim = 7.7 s,
meanaggressor = 7.6 s). In contrast, the choice measure revealed that
infants robustly chose the victim in the AI condition (16 of 20
infants, binomial test, two-tailed, p= .012) but not in the NI
condition (9 of 20 infants, p= .824). These outcomes reflect a
significant difference between the two conditions (Fisher’s exact
test, two-tailed, p = .048; see Fig. 2).
We found that infants preferentially reached for the victim over
the aggressor in the AI condition but not in the NI condition,
indicating that infants formed different evaluations for figures
based on the nature of their previous interactions and preferred
others in distress. These results cannot be explained by low-level
perceptual interpretations, at least such as movement speed,
kinetic momentum, and deformation, because they were the same
for the two figures. In addition, there was no difference in looking
time during the familiarization trials for both conditions. Thus,
infant preference can confidently be attributed to differential
interactions between the geometric figures in the two conditions.
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Therefore, our findings suggest that 10-month-old infants show
sympathetic responses toward attacked others.
The lack of correspondence between looking-time and choice
behavior may be attributable to insufficient exposure time in the
familiarization trials, as infants’ looking-time preferences some-
times vary because of factors such as stimulus complexity and
duration of exposure (e.g., [25]). As another possibility for this lack
of correspondence is that while some infants might prefer the
victim, others might look longer at aggressors because they pose a
threat. Indeed, 9 of the 16 infants who chose the victim
preferentially looked at the victim, and the remaining 7
preferentially looked at the aggressor. However, when choosing
the character, they might have consistently reached for the
character that they wanted to approach, because they had to make
contact with that character. Although previous studies have shown
correspondence between preferential looking and choice behavior
[24,26], another recent study has reported a discrepancy in this
correspondence [27], much like in the present study. A third
possibility is that the difference between this and previous studies
Figure 1. Selected frames from the movie stimuli in each experiment. Figure (a) shows the animated stimuli of the Aggressive Interaction
(AI) condition in Experiments 1 and 2, in which one geometric figure crashes into the other. Figure (b) shows the animated stimuli of the No
Interaction (NI) condition in Experiment 1, in which the two geometric figures moved independently and without contact. Figure (c) shows the
animated stimuli in Experiment 2, in which two geometric figures interact in the same way as in (a), but the third figure moves independently.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065292.g001
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may be due to the different preferential looking methods (the use
of actual objects versus virtual objects displayed on a screen).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that infants behaviorally preferred
victims. However, it is conceivable that the infants acted not out of
sympathetic feeling for the victim but out of a desire to avoid the
aggressor. We examined this possibility in Experiment 2 by
repeating Experiment 1 with an added, neutral object during
familiarization trials. Thus, each familiarization video included
three objects: a victim, an aggressor, and a neutral. In the test
phase, infant selection of a neutral object or a victim object
(Neutral-Victim [NV] condition), or a neutral object or an
aggressor object (Neutral-Aggressor [NA] condition) was assessed.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-four 10-month-olds (12 male, 12
female; mean age = 297 days, range= 285–312 days) were
randomly assigned to either the NV (n=12) or the NA conditions
(n=12) group. Seven additional infants were tested but not
included in the final sample because they failed to meet the
inclusion criterion, which was the same as Experiment 1.
Stimuli and procedure. The materials and procedure were
identical to those in Experiment 1, except that (1) neutral
geometric figures and objects (a red cylinder, 6.5 cm in diameter
and length) were added in the familiarization and test phases,
respectively (see Fig. 1c and Video S4) and (2) we did not conduct
a preferential-looking task in the test phase, although we increased
the number of familiarization trials from six to eight.
In Experiment 2, a third, neutral geometric figure moved
independently of the other two figures. The neutral figure had the
same movement speed, momentum, and extent of deformation as
the other figures. However, to emphasize the independence of the
third neutral figure, the timing of its deformation was not
synchronized with that of the other two objects. The position of
the third figure was determined by inverting the average
coordinate axis between the other figures (see Fig. 1c).
Data analysis. Infant looking time at each of the animated
stimuli was calculated during the familiarization trials. In addition,
to investigate the differences in perceptual exposure between the
neutral object and the other two objects, infant gaze-shift
frequency between the neutral and victim/aggressor objects was
recorded. In the choice measure, the analysis inclusion criterion
was the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
In the familiarization trials, we used the same coding method as
in Experiment 1, and the two coders reached 97% agreement on
the looking time in each of the familiarization trials. Regarding the
mean looking times, there was no significant difference between
the NV and NA conditions (NV mean= 15.6 s, NA mean= 17.2 s,
t(22) = 1.607, p=0.122, d=0.66). In addition, regarding the mean
gaze-shift frequencies from the neutral object to the other objects
(or vice versa), we observed no significant difference between the
NV and NA conditions (mean NV gaze shifts = 8.4; mean NA gaze
shifts = 10.0, t(22) = 1.305, p=0.205, d=0.53).
The results from the test phase show that infants responded
differently to neutral objects in the choice task depending on
whether they were paired with victim or aggressor objects (Fisher’s
exact test, two-tailed, p = .003; see Fig. 3). Infants in the NV
condition robustly chose the victim (10 of 12 infants, binomial test,
two-tailed, p= .039), while infants in the NA condition robustly
chose the neutral object (10 of 12 infants, p= .039). These results
cannot be attributed to differences in perceptual exposure between
neutral objects and other objects, because infants frequently shifted
their gaze back and forth between the neutral object and the other
objects throughout the familiarization phase. In addition, there
was no difference in looking time during the familiarization trials
for both conditions. Therefore, infants’ subsequent choice
behaviors were most likely related to different evaluations of the
objects during the two choice conditions. The different object-
pairing results show that infants preferred victims and avoided
aggressors. This finding indicates that preference for victims in
Experiment 1 cannot be explained just by the desire to avoid
aggressors; instead, it appears that infants evaluate the respective
roles of victim and aggressor in interactions between the two.
Conclusions
In investigating sympathetic behavior in preverbal 10-month-
old infants, we demonstrated that they preferentially reached for
victims as opposed to aggressors and neutral objects after
observing third-party social interactions involving aggression.
These findings indicate that preverbal infants show a sympathetic
response toward attacked others who displayed no distress,
suggesting that rudimentary sympathy for others based on an
evaluation that is beyond merely a response to distressed others
through emotional contagion [2,3] occurs earlier in development
than previously assumed. Although emotional contagion may be
the mechanism of this sympathetic response [18,19], our results
cannot be explained solely by emotional contagion, because
victims did not express emotional signals and because infants
responded after the fact on the basis of their evaluations of third-
party interactions, abstracted from the actions of geometric figures.
Indeed, one recent study has demonstrated that toddlers show
Figure 2. The results of the choice task in Experiment 1. This
figure shows the percentage of infants who chose each object
(Experiments 1, n=20 in each condition). Single asterisks indicate
statistical significance, one-tailed, p,.05. Double asterisks indicate
statistical significance, two-tailed, p,.05. NS indicates not significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065292.g002
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sympathetic concern for distressed others in the absence of a
distressed emotional cue [7].
So what are the socio-cognitive processes behind infants’
evaluations, and how do they work to produce such sympathetic
responses? To evaluate each character in our task, infants needed
to understand who attacked and who was attacked. This cognitive
process requires an understanding of the goal directedness of the
agents and the causal relationship between them. Previous studies
demonstrated that, after six months of age, infants begin to
understand goal directedness [28,29] and causal agency [15–17].
This representation of agency constitutes an important aspect of
human cognition and is a key attribute in human ontogeny [30].
We suspect that because infants discriminated between the roles of
the geometric figures, they had some understanding of agency;
thus, sympathetic responses may rest on this sense of agency.
Moreover, to evaluate the characters, infants in our study needed
to regard the aggressive interactions as negative events. Recent
studies have demonstrated that 10-month-olds regard such hitting
interactions as negative [14]. This negative evaluation for hitting
interactions might derive from everyday interactions with parents
and siblings (e.g., experiencing being hit and watching others
being hit). Alternatively, as in a series of studies by Hamlin
[12,13,24], infants might acquire the cognitive ability necessary for
this evaluation earlier in their development. With any possibility, it
is possible that by combining many already-developed cognitive
abilities, infants begin to evaluate the identities of the victim and
aggressor based on their interaction, which results in a sympathetic
response toward the victim.
It is perhaps unclear whether this preference for the victim in
our task is derived from rudimentary sympathy. In fact, in our
experiment, infants did not manifest clear concerns or attempt to
comfort the victim. Nevertheless, previous studies have reported
that in early infancy, infants have well-developed socio-cognitive
abilities [11–14], and even rudimentary empathy [18,19], making
it plausible that this preference is derived from sympathetic
feelings. That said, it is likely that this preference for the victim is a
rudimentary form of sympathy. By using electroencephalography
data [31] and an index of physiological response such as stress and
pupil dilation [32] in our task, we might be able to provide
additional evidence that this preference for the victim is derived
from sympathetic feelings.
Although the sympathetic disposition reported here is not full-
fledged, a basic preference for the victim might function as a
foundation for more mature sympathetic behaviors, such as the
sympathetic concerns for distressed others that emerge later in
development [6,7]. This sympathetic disposition may make young
children more likely to attend to and approach others in trouble.
However, presently, it is unknown whether this sympathetic
disposition is related to full-fledged sympathetic behavior which
emerges later in development. Further studies are needed to
confirm the relationship between this disposition and the
sympathetic behavior observed in previous studies.
Recently, there is an ongoing debate about how to interpret the
results of this type of experiment. Scarf et al. demonstrated that
controlling for low-level perceptual information–such as whether
the acted character bounces–affects infant choice behaviors,
casting doubt on the more rich interpretation that social
evaluation influences infant behavior [14]. To address this, we
attempted to make the presented stimuli in the experimental
condition as simple as possible by removing extraneous informa-
tion and making the movement speed, kinetic momentum, and
deformation constant between the agents. However, in the control
condition, to ensure that this kind of low-level perceptual
information was the same as that in the experimental condition,
some elements of the interaction between the two agents could not
be controlled (e.g., the characters were crushed in different
directions between the conditions). However, to eliminate any
effect of interaction, such control procedures were deemed
appropriate, because it is reasonable to believe that infants might
have observed an interaction even if the two characters had had
no contact. Thus, although not all possible interaction elements
between the two agents were controlled for in the control
condition, we believe that the results of our experiments can
withstand such criticism.
In conclusion, by the age of 10 months, preverbal infants prefer
victims to aggressors and neutral objects when evaluating third-
party social interactions. This finding indicates that preverbal
infants show rudimentary sympathy toward others based on their
evaluation of characters’ interactions. Discovering how this
disposition emerges throughout development and contributes to
later sympathetic behavior requires additional research.
Supporting Information
Video S1 This movie file shows the attacker chased the
victim and hit it seven times, violently attacking and
crushing the victim at the end of the movie.
(MOV)
Video S2 This movie file shows the attacker and the
victim move independently and without any contact.
(MOV)
Video S3 This movie file shows another version of the
aggressive interaction.
(MOV)
Video S4 This movie file shows two geometric figures
interact in the same way as in Video S1, but the third,
neutral figure moves independently.
Figure 3. The results of the choice task in Experiment 2. This
figure shows the percentage of infants who chose each object
(Experiments 2, n=12 in each condition). Single asterisks indicate
statistical significance, one-tailed, p,.05. Double asterisks indicate
statistical significance, two-tailed, p,.05. NS indicates not significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065292.g003
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